

Revolutionary Armed Struggle

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Introduction

Our every action is a battle cry against Imperialism... wherever death may surprise us, let it be welcomed, provided that this, our battle cry, may have reached some receptive ear and another hand may be extended to wield our weapons.

— Che Guevara

In the course of building the mass and popular movement, and moving it towards class and national liberation struggle, it is imperative that it be able to defend its existence and protect its gains. The defense of the struggle will evolve, and become in turn, a determining aspect of the class and national liberation struggle. Revolutionary armed struggle can be defined in several ways based upon its organization and functions. But it is necessary for all to understand that armed struggle is governed by the political determination of the class and national liberation struggle. It is the condition of the aboveground political movement that determines how and to what extent armed struggle will be employed. The gun of the revolutionary is only an extension of the political program of the revolutionary organization, and this is what is meant by having *politics in command* in the underground.

The military arena in revolution must be the most politically determined arm of the entire class and national liberation struggle. This political determination is based upon revolutionaries having a thorough sense of objectivity towards the masses' general demands, and the prospects for the building a national movement. The military arena of the revolution has two primary objectives:

1. To defend the political movement of the masses' struggle.
2. To build and defend the military wing of the masses struggle. It is this line of defense that must be clearly understood by all revolutionaries.

The capacity to engage the enemy in revolutionary armed struggle is measured by the political determination of the class and national liberation struggle. It is essential that in preparation for war, revolutionaries recognize the various levels of political development to ensure the prospects of the entire mass movement being mobilized for specific goals and objectives. The

politico-military aspect of the revolutionary struggle must pass through four stages of development. Each stage has within it a dialectical relationship with the stages of development of the political mass movement. The first stage is a purely defensive posture. When the political movement has developed to a substantial level, it begins to threaten the social order of the State. Inevitably the State will attempt to crush the political mass movement, and in its attempts, will meet stiff resistance from political leaders, organizations and their supporters. This resistance is the first stage of a line of defense. The defense for all practical purposes is passive in its concept and development to defend when attacked, and establish defenses against attacks, but not to attack and offensively pursue the enemy. It is the existence of political organizations defense that characterize this stage of the political mass movement. In many instances, the greater the repression, the greater the resistance. It is when either the opposition wins at this first stage or is effectively repelled that will determine the nature of the next stage. Therefore, resistance in the first stage must be relentless to adequately stifle attempts of the State to crush and/or control the political mass movement and its organizations.

In order to gain an advantageous position to ensure the political movement's continued existence in light of greater repression, it is essential that a revolutionary military apparatus be established to move the first, passive stage of defense towards the second, active stage of defense. At this level of confrontation between the State and the political movement, the question of armed struggle usually forces leaders of many political organizations to consider new lines of defense in their political programs. If a revolutionary leader should decide to abrogate the original objective solely because of the State's opposition, this is likely to be liberalism or revisionism, and he or she will be subverting the movement, and destroying the militancy of the masses. At this time it would be best for leaders to direct a part or the whole organization to begin functioning clandestinely (underground); while a part relinquishes offensive resistance and establishes a purely legal political posture or a new (aboveground) organization in place of the one that has gone underground. In this way, the momentum of the struggle continues, the political objective is not compromised, while an active clandestine organization preserves the militancy and defense of the political mass movement.

The second stage of defense in the movement is an active defense, commonly referred to as a "counter-offensive". At this stage, resistance to the State has evolved towards armed struggle in defense of the political demands of the movement. This level of armed struggle offensively defends the political basis from which the political mass movement can continue to educate, organize, and mobilize the masses against racist, capitalist-imperialist domination. In

offensively defending the political direction of the movement, armed struggle must be supported as a legitimate means of resistance, as the means to combat the State's violent opposition to the revolutionary mass movement.

At this stage, armed struggle would seek to raise the concerns of the masses' resistance by militantly pursuing enemy forces. This pursuit would be characterized by sabotage, assassinations, kidnapping for ransom, and harassment bombings to disrupt communications and the mobilization of enemy forces in their efforts to block the goals of the political movement. It would be incumbent at this stage to call for the arming of the masses in struggle, for the masses to militantly defend the cause of the political mass movement, and to join the resistance forces in the underground. The primary objective of the "counter-offensive" stage of struggle is to preserve the militancy of the movement and to arm the masses in struggle, to instill the spirit of revolution throughout every segment of the class and national liberation struggle, and build a revolutionary army to defend the revolution. In order to accentuate the political demands of the movement, armed struggle would offensively engage reactionary individuals, political bureaucracies, or monopoly-capitalist corporations, and force them to serve the needs of the revolution. When the State opposes the needs and demands of the mass movement (food, housing, clothing, employment, health care), it will be calling for the armed clandestine organization to militantly resist such opposition. It is in this development of the revolutionary armed struggle, that the masses become armed with the spirit of militant resistance to racist, capitalist-imperialism, and begin to build offensively towards establishing the principles, politics and political program of the armed struggle.

This process is gradual, evolving over a series of political struggles, strengthening the determination of the class and national liberation struggle. Because the revolution is protracted and conspiratorial in nature, it is necessary that the theoretical and ideological concepts of the revolution be thoroughly integrated within the various political and social organizations throughout the country. These ideological and political determinations must preserve the theoretical and practical basis from which armed struggle is manifested in the revolution. Hence, the first two stages in defense of the political mass movement will be based on preparing for revolutionary war, a protracted process of establishing defense mechanisms that are wholly encompassed of armed struggle being politically determinative in revolution.

Before examining the third stage, it is necessary to explain further that the prospect of armed struggle is based upon the educational and organizational development of the masses. It is when the masses are militantly organized to forge the movement towards the ultimate demands for the control of the social means of production in a general uprising that the military aspect of

struggle will reach its greatest combative level and take the offensive. Furthermore, the political and military development of the revolution will be afflicted with splits, setbacks, betrayals, partial and temporary compromises, as well as, retreats and reversals. All of these are the subjective and objective realities of building revolutionary armed struggle and will slow down the arming of the masses with militant spirit of revolution.

Thereby, until this qualitative level of the masses resistance to domestic neocolonialism and class oppression has been reached, the class and national liberation struggle must prepare for war. It is this preparation for war which makes the movement prolonged and protracted.

During the course of preparing for war, the military forces will engage capitalist-imperialism in struggle. In preparation for the offensive, the military apparatuses will build extensive guerrilla organizations and networks for logistics, communications, supplies, mobilization, and developing bases for training new recruits. Thus engaging the enemy while preparing for the offensive, is essentially an active defense in support of the current political level of the movement. It will serve to develop the military forces by providing experiences in military affairs. The difference between an active and a passive defense is based upon the strength of the military apparatus, the political level of the movement, and the subjective condition of the engagement. A passive defense is basically when the military cadre/unit is being attacked by the counter-revolutionary forces of the State (police, FBI, National Guard, etc.). In defending against such attacks, the revolutionary military apparatus is weak either in numbers, firepower, or when organizationally the political base for armed offensive is shallow; the revolutionary military apparatus must then defend its continued existence in the plight of the enemy's offensive. By attacking the enemy the revolutionary force attempts to disrupt, harass, and stifle the enemy's counter-revolutionary ability to destroy either the political or the military aspects of the class and national liberation struggle. An active defense preserves the belligerency of the revolutionary military apparatus, and the basis from which the counter-offensive can either transform into a purely offensive posture or safely secure a strategic retreat without falling victim to a passive defense.

The third stage is purely offensive in character. The masses have been mobilized in support of revolutionary armed struggle, armed struggle has been organized to meet the varied demands of the mass movement, and is strategically able to engage the counter-insurgency forces mastering the subjective and objective technical and material aspects of waging guerrilla war. At this stage, the goal of revolutionary armed struggle is to disarm the opposition, to annihilate the enemy, to present a threat to the security of racist, capitalist-imperialist domination leading to their ceasing belligerent

resistance and the complete surrender to the demands of the revolutionary struggle. This ultimately means that armed struggle must challenge the profit motive base from which capitalist-imperialism continues to reap enormous profits and is able to pay its various State security forces (police, FBI, National Guard, etc.). Also, at this stage, the masses will be calling for their family members in the various State security forces to abandon those responsibilities, and begin to serve the aspirations of the revolution. This is a time when turmoil, dissention and corruption infects every major institution of the State, weakening the State's resistance to the demands of the revolution. The State will be brought to a stand still, the masses will take to the streets in riots, mass demonstrations, general strikes, and occupations of factories, corporations, institutions, and military bases, while clandestine armed operations will engage the enemy in pitched battles of mobile guerrilla warfare.

The pure or strategic offensive will propel the revolution towards its decisive conclusion. Amidst tactical military errors, it will be the arming of the masses and their mobilization that will assure the revolution's victories, virtually destroying racist, capitalist-imperialism. This mobilization and arming of the masses will be a two-pronged offensive: 1) Mobilization for the first part will be of non-violent protest demonstrations, strikes, etc. These mass mobilizations would have as their objectives the creation of disorder and disarray for the State, airing the masses discontent, obstructing the State's means of functioning and bringing the government to a stand still. These mass mobilizations in a strategic offensive will meet stiff resistance by reactionary forces (Klansmen, Neo-Nazis, Birchers, NRA, etc.). Because of the non-violent nature of mass mobilization, if organized and disciplined, the political objective of the mass movement will be secured, placing the repressive reactionary forces on the defensive. It is the defensive posture of the reactionary forces that will force the mass mobilization to become more militant, and necessitate the arming of the masses; 2) The arming of the masses will be into self-defense units (peoples' militia), whose primary responsibility will be the defense of the communities and the security of non-violent mass mobilizations, demonstrations, strikes, and occupations of bureaucratic institutions, manufacturers, nuclear complexes and military bases.

In this strategic offensive, the non-violent mass mobilization will broaden and deepen the socio-economic crisis, and press the demands of the revolution in every segment of the State's continued repressive government. The masses armed in self-defense units will ensure the first line of defense in the strategic offensive will preserve the militancy of the mass movement. It will thereby, also, allow the clandestine forces to engage the State security forces in mobile guerrilla warfare, and further disrupt and destroy monopoly

capitalist means to secure profits.

Once the strategic offensive has decisively demoralized, disarmed, or annihilated the repressive forces of the overthrown State, the mass movement and revolutionary military apparatus will move towards the last stage in the revolutionary armed struggle — the strategic defense.

The responsibility of the strategic defense will be to secure the gains of the protracted revolutionary war. It will be to search out and destroy various pockets of resistance from retreating reactionary forces; to identify those who betrayed the revolution and supporters of the reactionary forces; to reestablish order by developing the organizational collective leadership of the political mass movement towards the new socio-economic and political order based upon the demands of the masses during the long and arduous revolutionary war.

The strategic defense should preserve the masses' possession of arms in continued defense of the revolution in support of the socio-economic and cultural foundation of the new society. This is important because during the course of destroying racist capitalist-imperialism, enemies of the revolution will constantly attempt to restore monopoly capitalism, with the support of other capitalist, European powers. In the same way, various nations within the U.S. borders will consummate their national identity and reclaim their heritage from the ruins of U.S. domestic neo-colonial domination. The prospects of these nations becoming sovereign territories may provide ground for reactionaries to sow dissension (in divide and conquer tactics) between nations in hopes of reinstating capitalism in parts of the U.S. Thereby, the strategic defense must preserve and protect the political aspirations of all internal nations, as they were expressed throughout the protracted revolutionary war.

The course of the strategic defense will be one of the most difficult periods of the emerging revolutionary society. It will be a time when old demarcation lines of political alliances and coalitions between revolutionaries and against reactionary forces, will be redrawn in light of the new politico-military reality. Purges of old organizations and responsibilities will become common place as the new society reconstructs order and as the land, means of production, military machinery, and wealth of the old system is divided amongst the various nations. In the strategic defense, the historical epoch of the revolution will be characterized by the closing of one revolutionary era, and the beginning of a new era — during which the revolution will assure the criteria for its continued existence and motivation towards the birth of a new nation(s).

This brief description of the stages of the revolutionary struggle is intended to provide an overview of the protracted nature of the revolutionary struggle, and the necessity for politics to be in command of the revolutionary military apparatuses. Undoubtedly, it is necessary for the various oppressed nations to establish their national political programs in the course of the revolutionary movement, and to establish mechanisms to defend their national political aspirations.

It is this line of defense that will assure the revolution's success, and mobilize oppressed people across the entire country to support and participate in the revolutionary armed struggle.

The Question of Terrorists

It must be categorically denied from the outset that revolutionary armed forces engage in terrorism. On the contrary, armed struggle combats the terrorism of the State security forces and reactionary elements with counterterrorism in defense of the political mass movement.

The State depicts revolutionaries as terrorists in its attempts to prevent the masses from supporting revolutionaries. This psychological propaganda tactic by the State is reasonable ground for concern for all political activists and revolutionaries because it depicts them as being belligerent aggressors. In all actuality, it is the State's security forces repressive measures that are the aggressors, infringing upon the political organizations and leaders who are building the class and national liberation struggle. Since the development of the revolutionary armed struggle commences from a defensive posture against the attempts of the State to crush or control the political mass movement, it is absurd that revolutionaries should be considered terrorist. It is the State and its security forces (police, FBI, National Guard, etc.) who are the terrorists and must be identified as such in agitation-propaganda work of the class and national liberation struggle.

When the State calls the defensive measures of revolutionary armed struggle terrorist, at the same time the class and national liberation struggle identifies State repression as terrorist, the State's psychological campaign against the revolutionary armed struggle will be destroyed. The class and national liberation struggle will identify revolutionary armed activity as counter-terrorism and revolutionary justice in contrast to State repression.

This concept of agitation-propaganda in identifying State repression as terrorist forges an understanding of the defensive posture of revolutionary armed struggle. It broadens the base from which the class and national liberation struggle will educate the masses in support of revolutionary armed struggle, and to how guerrilla operations are essential to protect the objectives of the class and national liberation struggle. Although, it is true the State will engage in anti-guerrilla operations, these operations will be marked as terrorist, indiscriminately attacking the various political organizations and revolutionary leadership, and the masses aspirations for socio-economic and political change.

Building the Guerrilla Front

The guerrilla front is essentially divided into three functional parts. Each is interrelated and interdependent with the other, although each are an entity of its own. In the body of the guerrilla front skeleton, the most important part is the intelligence and communication network; second in importance are the internal organs, the logistics and supply network; lastly, are the muscles, the operational network of armed cadres and teams. Two other forces of the class and national liberation struggle can also be considered parts of the guerrilla front, but under a different command structure. The community self-defense units (people's militia) may very well be under the direction of the community political organization but also responsive to the needs of the underground forces, while elite assault squads and assassination teams, will be under the direct command of special operations (fifth column), which may be part of the underground combat units or may be a super secret operational unit separate from the larger organizational structure.

Each of these armed units must be trained, indoctrinated, and disciplined in the political, as well as, the military program of the revolutionary armed forces. It is the organizational structure and training of the guerrillas of the guerrilla front in direct relation to the political mass movement, that will determine the essential criteria upon which the armed forces will be able to strategically and offensively take control of the military aspects of the class and national liberation struggle.

Infra-Structure of the Guerrilla Front

Organizationally, the three interdependent parts of the guerrilla front should be led by a staff of military officers whose primary responsibility would be to maintain the orientation, indoctrination, training, placement, and planning of operations. These officers would be the brain of the Guerrilla Front.

(1) Orientation and Indoctrination

Each new recruit into the clandestine guerrilla formation should be processed through a screening and orientation process, to evaluate a new recruit's comprehension of the class and national liberation struggle to learn what political material he or she had read, what political experience they have had prior to being recruited. Various security checks should be made to vouchsafe the recruits placement after going through a process or indoctrination and before getting into military affairs of the clandestine guerrilla operations.

(2) Training

Guerrilla training should be rigorous, regimented, demanding discipline and sacrifice. Once a recruit has been processed through orientation and indoctrination, they should be sent to a training base facility. There training should consist of the following:

1. Map and draft reading
2. Terrain and field work with use of compass
3. Test of memory and intelligence (photo identification)
4. The use of propaganda, communications and information, cryptographic codes, documents, use of CB's, short wave radio and walkie-talkies.
5. Interrogation technique and stress test
6. First aid and medical training
7. Transportation

8. Physical exercise

9. The use of technical equipment (weapons and explosives) and sabotage

Training base facilities should be super secret hide-a-ways, where various files, documents, and equipment can be kept. No new recruit should ever know exactly where the training base facility is located. They should be blindfolded, asleep (drugged) or in some way prevented from learning the destination, especially when the facility is one where there is training in technical equipment and sabotage. Training (A-F) that does not require extensive outside or environmental coverage can be in either urban or rural areas, inside or outside the United States, but technical training in weapons handling and sabotage must be in rural areas or outside the U.S.

All training base facilities should be staffed by revolutionaries who have served the demands of training, and are proficient in various fields. When necessary, such bases should be able to evacuate and destroy incriminating material at a moments notice. Evaluation of the performance of new recruits in training should determine the specific area within the guerrilla front in which they will be placed.

(3) Placement

The placement of a recruit who graduates from the training base facility should be based upon the evaluation and efficiency of the graduate, the needs of the guerrilla front, and the needs of the class and national liberation struggle. It is the responsibility of the Strategic Military Command, to make the placement and to assign a cadre or squad leader to maintain vigilance over the new guerrilla operative.

(4) Planning

The planning of guerrilla operations by the guerrilla front is the sole responsibility of the Strategic Military Command. Such planning must be based upon evaluation of the course of the class and national liberation struggle; the intelligence, material and personnel available for operations; the strength and weakness of the State's security forces in comparison to the ability of the guerrilla front to engage the enemy and, any other factors influencing the military conditions of the revolutionary armed struggle.

Planning guerrilla operations must be responsive to the subjective and objective realities effecting the political arena of the revolutionary armed

struggle, always seeking to enhance the political advantage of the mass movement while not jeopardizing the military capacity of the guerrilla front. Planning for operations must rely upon the stability of the guerrilla front, should not be overtly extended in its functioning ability. The planning of guerrilla operations must wholly evaluate the capacity of the entire guerrilla front, the means and ends of the operation, and the politico-military consequences of the success or loss of such operations.

(5) Operations

Guerrilla front operations can be defined in two major categories: 1) Those operations that preserve the existence and functioning capacity of the guerrilla front; 2) Those operations that serve the politico-military interest of the class and national liberation struggle.

In both cases, such operations should examine the prospects of success by utilizing the equipment and personnel necessary to maintain the military advantage. All military operations should have a total strategy comprising tactical initiatives that are interrelated to secure success with minimum risk factors. It is the tactical implementation of any military strategy that must be thoroughly detailed, each piece of equipment and all personnel must be employed for specific tasks and reasons specific to the operation. The responsibility of the Strategic Military Command is to plan operations, and always take into consideration the fighting capacity of the guerrilla cadre-team. The cadre-team leader is responsible for the implementation and success of all operations.

(6) Special Operations

A) Special Ops. Personnel

These cadre-teams consist of individuals who are specialists in a specific field (sniping, demolition, sky diving, underwater scuba swimming, flying planes, and the handling of technical equipment) and who have the experience, courage and determination to take the risk necessary for the accomplishment of a particular operation. They may be individual guerrillas who move between various units within the guerrilla front, instructors at training base facilities, or a secret unit known only by the Strategic Military Command and called only for operations of a highly specialized nature. These special operations cadre-teams may work with other guerrilla formations in an

overall strategic operation or individually, depending on the nature of the task.

B) Intelligence and Communications

The intelligence and communication network of the infrastructure is the skeleton structure of the guerrilla front, the foundation upon which the guerrilla front builds its means to exist and serve the class and national liberation struggle.

Most intelligence consists of research and gathering information on possible targets for guerrilla operations. Such targets include armaments-munitions depots and factories; petroleum energy-power installations; railroads, reactionary capitalist personages. It also provides information concerning the political mass movement, its organization and leaders, and anything that might serve the interest of the guerrilla front.

Intelligence and information is the prime factor that will allow the Strategic Military Command to build the guerrilla base of operation, and to assure supplies are appropriated for future operations. Dissemination of intelligence and reports to the proper military officials are important to maintain and determine the course of the revolutionary armed struggle; to forge even development throughout the guerrilla front; and, to publicize the activity of the guerrilla front across the country. The intelligence and communications network must be a clandestine web of revolutionaries infiltrating every level of the U.S. capitalist and military system and the aboveground political arena. These revolutionaries must be dedicated, politically astute, and accountable for every bit of information received by the Strategic Military Command; they must be profound in their investigation techniques, and thorough in their research. Communications that serve to disseminate intelligence-information to the Strategic Military Command should be coded or disguised in such a way as to prevent detection in case of capture or leaks in the network.

The intelligence and communications network of the infrastructure will also serve as the agitation-propaganda wing of the guerrilla front, to send or deliver communiques, to propagate guerrilla activity in leaflets, pamphlets or graffiti; also, on occasions to pirate radio or television transmission to broadcast a message from the guerrilla front.

C) Logistics and Supplies

The logistics and supply networks of the infra-structure are the internal (circulatory and digestive) organs that serve the body of the guerrilla front. They are based upon intelligence and information received on materials or technical equipment that may be armed, they are not regular combat units, but armed for self-defense in the course of securing, transferring and maintenance of technical equipment and material. They are also responsible for setting up safe houses, transportation, underground hospitals, establishing training base facilities, and obtaining various documents (identification papers, passports, technical manuals, map-drafts, etc.)

The logistics and supply network must be a clandestine structure comprising the most trustworthy revolutionaries, who are familiar with the handling of various technical materials (explosives, detonator caps, grenades, mortars and mines, etc.). They should also be trained in picking locks, how to dismantle security alarm systems, burglary techniques generally how to get in the target area and retrieve the sought-after material and equipment. The cadre-team leader of this network must be capable of defending themselves with arms when necessary and of determining the best means of accomplishing the task with the least risk factor and the greatest prospects of success.

D) Operations

The area of operations is the muscle in the infra-structure body of the guerrilla front. It has the responsibility of resistance to the State terrorist attacks on the class and national liberation struggle. Operations will bring the struggle close to the military overthrow of racist, capitalist-imperialism, by forging a politico-military determination in the revolutionary movement through armed actions that counter the repressive terror of the State, and that support the political aspirations of the mass movement by attacking, destroying, or neutralizing various monopoly-capitalist installations, institutions or political-corporate personages who attempt to prevent or stifle the revolution.

The cadres and teams that will function in the area of operations will be defined as irregular guerrillas. The irregular guerrilla unit will consist of four (4) to eight (8) revolutionaries who can be divided into two or more teams. It is the responsibility of these armed units to militarily engage the enemies of the class and national liberation struggle in armed combat, and to forge the revolutionary struggle towards its inevitable victory by securing and defending the political aspirations of the mass movement. Such operations, directed by the Strategic Military Command, to seek out and destroy a

particular adversary or institution of oppression should be carried out either by an armed unit in the specific area of the target or by a unit from another region. Mobile units will operate as semi-autonomous, irregular guerrilla units, which will be deployed according to the needs of the guerrilla front and the political mass movement, while stationary or non-mobile units will operate in specific locations.

Essentially, the stationary armed units will deal in areas of operations that are directly linked to the political determination of the class and national liberation struggle in that region. The mobile units will serve the national interest of the guerrilla front and the revolutionary armed struggle operation to neutralize or liquidate various targets that preserve the continued strength of the reactionary armed forces of the State across the country.

The irregular guerrilla unit must be well trained in the implementation of tactical initiatives within a military strategy. They must be resourceful in offense, defense, and retreat, and in expending the least amount of human and material energy for the maximum effect.

E) Special Operations

Special operations units will consist of those guerrillas who are trained in specific fields or use of technical equipment, and are capable of performing extraordinary tasks in the field of sabotage, expropriations, assassination, infiltration or kidnapping.

The embodiment or flesh of the guerrilla front is the political mass movement. The brains and heart of the guerrilla front is the Strategic Military Command. The skeleton or bone structure is the intelligence and communication network. The internal organs (circulation and digestion) is the logistic and supply network, and the muscles are operations. In this description, the organizational structure of the guerrilla front can be likened to a living organism, the various parts affecting the whole of the front. If any part becomes ineffective, the guerrilla front becomes ill or nonfunctional in terms of maintaining and sustaining the means to engage in protracted revolutionary armed struggle. Just as the human body would succumb to a physical disorder. The most vital part of the guerrilla front is the Strategic Military Command, which must be protected in layers of secrecy just as the ribs and skull protects the heart and brain of the human body.

The intelligence and communication network must protect itself against breaks. It must become secure and hard on the surface, while internally (like bone marrow) it disseminates the necessary information and prevents the

infiltration of agents in the infra-structure. The internal (circulatory and digestive) organs — the logistics and supplies can act upon information received and further enhance the guerrilla front operative ability to engage the enemy in combat; employing irregular guerrilla units (muscles) in operations to move the entire guerrilla front apparatus towards the culmination of the class and national movement.

Urban Guerrilla Warfare

The future of urban guerrilla warfare in North America's major cities depends on many factors. The primary factor is the degree to which the mass movement is militantly organized and mobilized to confront the issues, to make demands on the State, and to support armed resistance. The secondary factor is the clandestine apparatus urban guerrillas have constructed to preserve their base of operations.

For the most part, the urban guerrilla will be operating inside or near their immediate area of residence, and where police repression and containment of the mass movement is heavily concentrated. Therefore, it is necessary for the urban guerrilla to have the mobility to travel freely, to have first hand knowledge of the environment, and be able to utilize accessible transportation. The use of disguise and dress, appearance, and mannerisms is important to prevent detection by the many (uniformed and un-uniformed) police entrapment agents and informers who saturate the inner city. The urban guerrilla must ensure and preserve the initiative in defending the political mass movement, effecting the socio-economic and political instability of the urban center. It is when the political mass movement recognizes that the irregular guerrillas are functioning to support their political demands that the oppressed masses will seek to support irregular guerrilla activity.

The invisible tentacles of the urban guerrilla forces must each reach into every aboveground political organization, community liberation associations and various (inner city) bureaucratic agencies of the State. These tentacles will provide the urban guerrilla with intelligence and information as well as supplies and logistics vital for on-going operations.

Although many attacks on urban guerrilla targets will inconvenience the urban populace — such as cutting telephone services, lights and electric power-lines, or obstructing mass transportation systems, cutting water services or destroying radio and television networks — it must be clearly established that such actions will serve to undermine, demoralize and destroy the profits of the capitalist ruling class, and thereby serve the interest of the masses.

Some of the major targets in urban centers will be police department personnel and equipment, banks, television and radio networks, media and communications centers, various social services bureaucracies, power plants and installations, department stores, businesses, shopping centers, computer complexes, transportation networks (buses, trains, planes), and those individuals who represent the interests of the ruling class. Tactics such as sabotage to destroy or cripple a particular target; assassination to exterminate an enemy of the mass movement; kidnapping for ransom; or acts of armed propaganda, should all be consistent with the political demands of the mass movement or supportive of the needs of the guerrilla apparatus. No armed action should be undertaken that does not readily coincide with the momentum of the political mass movement, or cannot be easily understood by the masses as a necessary tactic. It is this significant principle that assures that politics command the military operations of urban guerrilla, and assures that armed actions of the urban guerrilla do not stifle or hamper the organizing and mobilizing of the masses in struggle.

The nature of urban guerrilla operations is fluid, flexible and maintains a defensive posture. It is this nature that determines its internal strength and ability to sustain a protracted defensive posture. It enables it to defend the political mass movement, and to preserve the means from which the urban guerrilla will allow the political mass movement to lead the class and national liberation struggle. While the urban guerrilla employs such tactics as surprise, and devastating military strength to assure the necessary consequences of reactionary resistance to the mass movement is undertaken. The character of urban guerrilla operations internally is based on the morale, courage, political determination, and leadership of the guerrilla and their organizational capacity to engage the enemy.

Military victories are important because victories build morale for both the guerrilla and the masses. Failures, captures and deaths of urban guerrillas, on the other hand, demoralizes and discourages the masses. Therefore, it is imperative that the urban guerrillas do not engage in any operations without the full military means to assure their success.

Urban guerrilla warfare should have a politico-military strategy that totally encompasses the socio-economic and political determination of the class and national liberation struggle on local, regional, and national levels. It is the development of a revolutionary military strategy that will maintain a national political perspective, which will in turn preserve urban guerrilla warfare and broaden the base from which urban guerrilla warfare will emerge across the entire country. The political determination of fighting a guerrilla war must be thoroughly propagated. In this way, urban guerrilla formations will have a political determination that is the outgrowth of the

political mass movement throughout North American. Hence, local and regional issues will be transcended by the national political struggle, and urban guerrilla warfare will eventually take on the national character of revolutionary struggle for class and national liberation.

Establishing a politico-military strategy and developing the broad base of political support assures urban guerrillas the objective condition for initiating urban guerrilla warfare while the subjective realities are based upon the guerrillas organizational formation. Such an apparatus must have several organized clandestine networks penetrating the social lives of the ghetto, barrios, and inner city communities. Also, it is imperative that the guerrilla network infiltrate vestiges of the city bureaucracies (city hall, police departments, judicial system), and institutions (banks, insurance and finance companies, social services, etc.).

It is this ability of the guerrilla network to filter its organized politico-military body throughout the entire city that vouch safes the initiation and continuance of the urban guerrilla warfare. It thus builds towards control of the urban center, both politically and militarily. The consolidation of the various guerrilla networks within the working social-mechanism of the urban center powers the class and national liberation struggle to become militant and pose a serious threat to the stability of the city.

Furthermore, such infiltrations and penetrations allow the urban guerrilla to frustrate, disrupt and destroy the prospects of the ruling class resisting and retaliating against the mass movement. This initiative provides the urban guerrilla with the advantage of striking in the heart of the city, eventually paralyzing it and confronting the State security forces and reactionary elements (police, FBI, National Guard, vigilantes) based upon their own information and logistics.

It has been stated that urban guerrilla warfare must be fluid, flexible and defensive in posture, but must maintain the initiative in armed activity. The principle of being fluid and flexible is based upon the urban guerrilla being capable of attacking with precision, swiftness and superiority, while also being able to retreat without hesitation and become non-engaging in military activity. The fluidity and flexibility of guerrilla operations is substantiated by the element of surprise, sabotage and diversionary tactics, kidnapping for ransom, hijacking commercial trucks and expropriations, ambush-assaults, sniping attacks and psychological warfare that harasses and demoralizes the enemy. To have the initiative to employ a particular military tactic, the when, how, and where to strike or not to engage in a military objective, determines the flexibility of the urban guerrilla. Although the urban guerrilla initiates armed struggle, such initiation is in defense of the political mass

movement. Hence, the defensive posture does not prevent the initiation of a military campaign. It rather ensures that the military campaign does not abandon the political aspirations of the mass movement. This is to prevent military romanticism and adventurism, which can opportunistically hamper the development of the masses militancy in support of armed struggle, which is dialectically in response to their socio-economic and political oppression.

The urban guerrilla must guard against taking a purely military offensive posture when the State security forces and armed reactionary elements indiscriminately attack, harass and terrorize the mass movement, its leaders and organizations. It will not be until the political mass movement has been mobilized offensively, and the urban center has been brought to a standstill that the military offensive can realistically be taken.

If the State security forces initiate seek and destroy, encircle-contain and suppression campaigns, which present a threat of liquidation to the urban guerrilla apparatus, it is incumbent on these revolutionary armed forces to engage in strategic retreat — to assure the prospects of future operations. The strategic retreat serves to prevent military confrontations to further secure the clandestine apparatus from detection, and to prevent any stationary confrontations. Although the strategic retreat encourages the ceasing of military confrontations it does not mean that irregular urban guerrillas should surrender all operations. Operations that disperses the enemy's offensive, disrupts or subverts the enemy from encircling or destroying the guerrilla clandestine base area or apparatus without direct engagement, should not be curtailed. Also, at this time the urban guerrilla should forge operations that serve the maintenance of the apparatus and obtains supplies and logistics. Investigating intelligence for future operations, training new recruits, and placing new cadre-teams or changing base areas should all be done at this time. Furthermore, the development of new communications lines, gaining funds, agitation-propaganda work, and re-analyzing the political military strategy should all take precedence during a strategic retreat.

The urban guerrilla will also have the responsibility to ensure that various political organizations and their leadership are adhering to the socio-economic and political demands of the oppressed masses. They must make sure the leadership of political organizations do not abrogate or compromise the masses aspirations with the bourgeoisie. They must guard against revisionism and sectarian schisms, and against usurping authority in the movement to themselves or their organizations, instead of fighting for the creation of a United Front or the National Liberation Front. Misleadership on the part of those representing the interest of the political mass movement must be exposed, with detailed and documented evidence. And when leaders

do not correctly respond to principled constructive criticism, they must be removed from their positions.

Many irregular urban operations must serve the masses demands directly by supplying medical equipment for health clinics; finance and material for the community liberation schools; food supplies for the coops; arms and ammunition for the community self-defense units (peoples' militia). In this way, the politico-military strategy of the guerrilla front serves to defend and preserve the entire class and national liberation struggle.

The revolutionary politico-military strategy of the guerrilla front must further develop the base from which the demands of oppressed nations independence, self-determination and sovereignty can be realized.

When the militancy of the national liberation struggles of oppressed nations has determined that the seizure of the urban centers is a tactical initiative, in a political strategy to force the demands of self-determination and independence, the emphasis in the politico-military strategy of the guerrilla front will shift towards substantiating rural guerrilla warfare.

Rural Guerrilla Warfare

There are many similarities between urban and rural guerrilla warfare. Each adheres to the principle of politics being in command of military activity, and each has as its ultimate goals the destruction of racist, capitalist-imperialism. The similarities extend to operational relationships which enhance the prospects of building and mobilizing a national liberation army by the guerrilla front.

The operational relationship between urban and rural guerrilla warfare is based upon the political goals and objectives of the class and national liberation struggle, and the military situation which serves the political mass movement. The military conditions and factors which will forge a dialectical and close relationship between urban and rural guerrilla forces are based upon environmental conditions, technical and material assistance, and the foundation from which the revolutionary armed forces will seize the land and nation.

In the many rural areas, small towns and villages will provide rural guerrilla forces with a base from which to launch specific campaigns. Other small towns and villages will be captured for periods of time to propagate the cause of the revolution and organize the populace to support it. Still other towns and villages will be destroyed. But it must be clearly understood such destruction will only be done in defense of the revolution, when these centers serve as strongholds for reactionary forces. The small towns and villages will serve the class and national liberation struggles, by providing bases from which guerrilla forces can build and sustain rural operations. They will establish farm cooperatives, technical equipment maintenance depots (weapons repair, armaments making, etc.), printing and propaganda distribution centers, and storage depots. These small rural communities, under the direction of political organizations (communes and collectives) and the guerrilla front will become the mainstay of the revolution.

They will become the “clandestine rearguard”, organized to provide the crucial needs of the political mass movement in the urban centers and the rural operations of the guerrilla front. Training base facilities will serve urban and rural guerrilla training. Most of these bases will be established in rural areas. Thus it will be incumbent upon those guerrillas who are most familiar

with the rural terrain to maintain such bases, building a security perimeter in outlying areas, and communications systems between various safe houses in the rural community surrounding the training base. Constant exchange of information, intelligence and logistics between urban and rural guerrilla teams and squads will be vital. The exchange data will pertain to the use of highways and patrols, convoys and transfer of materials vital to either the State or to the guerrilla front operations. This shared intelligence will determine what forces in the guerrilla front will pursue the operation and where jurisdictional operational areas will be established to support other objectives.

The majority of rural guerrilla forces will be mobile combat units that will engage in operations of sabotage, expropriations, and ambushes on such targets as power installations (gas, electrical, nuclear), dams, bridges, chemical plants and manufacturers that serve the military-industrial complex, armaments depots, railroad lines, petroleum refineries, and various transportation lines to and from urban areas.

In many cases, racist vigilantes (Klan, Neo-Nazi, Minutemen, etc.) will guard various strategic targets. These reactionary armed forces will also terrorize predominantly Black and other Third World townships and villages. In defense of the revolution, rural guerrilla forces will engage these reactionary elements in combat either in an attack on specific targets or in defense of a Black-Third World rural community. In the case of the Black-Third World rural community, it is extremely important that *peoples' militia* are organized in direct relations with the revolutionary socio-politico organizations in the area. The establishment of those Black-Third World inhabitants militia is crucial to the survival of those Black-Third World inhabitants who are in support of the military development of the revolution.

It is these rural guerrilla operations that dialectically serve to support the urban guerrilla operations to seize the urban centers. Rural guerrilla forces will cut off the urban centers' source of supplies and energy, and will set ambushes for the State security forces that will operate in rural areas attempting to track, encircle and suppress rural guerrilla operations.

In suburban outlying communities, both rural and urban guerrillas may operate. The political base of support might be shallow because of the petty bourgeoisie composition of the suburban population. But many factories and power installations are located in these areas, and business and political personages who are avowed enemies of the class and national liberation struggle.

The nature of the rural guerrilla army will be that of a mobile strike force.

Such a strike force will employ hit and run tactics, using the element of surprise, the technical equipment and the skills necessary to accomplish an operation and employing as many rural guerrillas as necessary to vouch safe the strategic and tactical advantage. It is incumbent on the Strategic Military Command to develop its functional capacity to forge both urban and rural guerrilla base formations.

Multi-National Guerrilla Formation

The development of a multi-national guerrilla formation depends upon the continued socialization of the political mass movement, and the relationship between the various oppressed nations and exploited classes. As the mass movement tears down national, class and sexist divisions, the prospects of the growth of many multi-national guerrilla formations is enhanced. Such has been the case with past infantile groups, such as the Symbionese Liberation Army, the Red Guerrilla Family, and the New World Liberation Front. Each of these urban guerrilla formations was multinational, anti-sexist, and anti-imperialist in character, and each evolved out of the multi-national character of the prison movement support groups in California.

The nature of multi-national guerrilla formation must be anti-colonial and anti-imperialist and must work in defense of the entire class and national liberation struggle. They will have certain advantages over revolutionary nationalist guerrilla formations. Their primary advantage is the ability of particular nationalities to enter a given area dominated by their own nationality, and be able to operate undetected. In the current racist social structure, a Euro-American would look suspicious in the heart of the Black-African or Latino community. The same would hold true for an African or Latino operating in a Euro-American community. Thus, in a multi-national guerrilla formation, the advantage of operating in various ethnic communities is paramount. A multi-national formation also provides a greater foundation for being seen as anti-racist by the political mass movement.

While the various revolutionary nationalist guerrilla formations will establish a direct relationship with their own peoples, the multi-national guerrilla formation will seek to merge the various nationalist formations into a United Guerrilla Front or Peoples Liberation Army. A Peoples Liberation Army will probably evolve out of a greater politico-socialization within the political mass movement, and the necessity of the various revolutionary nationalist guerrilla formations to assist each other in tactical operations and in the exchange of technical equipment, logistics and intelligence. The broad based political socialization in both the political and military arena will substantiate the foundation upon which the revolution will be won. This is

not to infer revolutionary nationalist formations in either the political or military arena will have to negate their political existence. Rather, revolutionary nationalism and internationalist solidarity is the epitome and dialectical progression of politico-socialization within the class and national liberation struggle. Multi-national apparatus, alliances, coalitions and fronts will reflect the quantitative socialization process, qualitatively forged with the creation of a National Liberation Front and Peoples Liberation Army.

It is incumbent of Euro-American organizations and parties to establish communes in rural areas. These will serve as the bases from which backward people in rural communities can be educated and organized in support of the class and national liberation struggle. The various reservations of Native Americans should develop training bases and supply networks; rural Black communities must develop rearguard support for the urban guerrilla struggle; the Latino and Mexican migrant workers should build logistic and supplies networks in rural areas. Each of these areas of work in rural communities will serve the development of the guerrilla fronts' politico-military strategy, and will become the basis from which a multi-nationalist guerrilla front will be created. Each oppressed nation and class will be organized and mobilized for protracted revolutionary armed struggle in both urban and rural areas, and for the creation of the National Liberation Front and Peoples Liberation Army.

Overview

To establish the guerrilla front and the prospects of sustaining revolutionary armed struggle it is necessary for all progressives and revolutionaries to understand the strengths and weaknesses of the State.

The State's major weaknesses lie in the economic structure of capitalist-imperialism on the one hand, and the many national liberation struggles to end U.S. domination on the other. The economic and political upheaval of inflation and recession, devaluation of the dollar, rising taxes, unemployment, corporations, political corruption, racism, national oppression and sexism, all these will serve the revolution. They will become the revolution's strength and the State's weakness. The other side of the coin is the State's use of propaganda through the media, its ability to pit one class, nationality or sex against the other; its ability to provide monetary appeasement to quell discontent at a given time and place; its use of the various political institutions and politicians to divert the oppressed masses from directing their anger and frustrations at government and monopoly-capitalism; its use of the repressive State security forces (police, FBI, National Guard, CIA, etc.) and the judicial system (courts, prisons), all of which will be the State's greatest assets, along with economic and political support from NATO allies and Western European nations, all of which are the revolution's greatest obstacle.

Thus, in the political arena, the various progressive organizations must be capable of building the mass movement on their strengths and the State's weaknesses. They must penetrate the State's strength and work the subjective conditions against the objective reality in support of the revolution. Hence, the necessity to infiltrate the State security forces, and expose the many programs, projects and operations the State plans to use against the revolution. The collusion between the State and corporate business must be undermined, the military-industrial complex must be exposed in respects to its relationship to foreign policy (Trilateral Commission, UNESCO, NATO, CIA, NAFTA, GATT, WTO, etc.).

The politicians who work in support of U.S. colonial domination of Third World countries, and hamper the national liberation of oppressed nations, both domestically and outside the country, must be identified and

condemned. The misappropriation of government funds by politicians should be examined, detailed, and propagated to the oppressed masses. In this manner, the political arena will further weaken the State apparatus, allowing the oppressed masses to learn of the extent of their socio-economic disenfranchisement. The two party system of capitalist government will be exposed as a sham democracy that preserves the oppressive domination of the bourgeoisie over the working class and oppressed nations. That the U.S. Government is not a democracy, but actually a plutocracy.

Furthermore, the targeting, identifying, and exposure of the means by which the ruling class maintains its position and power will provide the basis from which the guerrilla front can move militarily to destroy capitalist-imperialism in concert with the strengthening political mass movement. The guerrilla front will employ its personnel and resources to impair, hamper and stifle the capitalist-imperialist expansion, and consolidation of major industries. It will destroy the military-industrial complex capacity to manufacture war technologies and equipment, and will further disrupt the political base from which monopoly-capitalism maintains control of the livelihood of the oppressed masses. Thus, politicians will be targets, as well as businessmen. They are the voice used by the State to propagate such political-industrial cooperation, and to attempt to persuade the oppressed masses that such activity will benefit their livelihood. As such they must be exposed and undermined. NAFTA and GATT are examples of their anti-workers/union activities.

The major point of concern is that capitalist-imperialism as a system of colonial oppression must be destroyed psychologically, socio-economically and politically. The social values and culture of capitalist-imperialism based upon racism and national oppression, sexism, individualism and competition must be completely undermined and condemned. Thereby, the war against racist, capitalist-imperialism in both the political and military arena is a total war effecting every aspect of the system, and the oppressed masses relationship to the system of government. The three important areas that must be thoroughly and continuously confronted in both political and military terms are:

1. The U.S. financial network and markets (banks, insurance and finance companies, Wall Street, and the stock market, major corporations, the military-industrial complex);
2. The technological development in business finance, and the U.S. military (various missile technologies, nuclear plants, computer complexes, electronic plants, and military aerodynamics corporations, etc.);
3. Politicians who are spokespersons for the ruling class, and who have the responsibility to persuade the oppressed masses to accept their continue

disenfranchisement.

It is in the area of economics, technological development, and politics that the revolutionary political and military forces will attack the vital interest of monopoly-capitalism and weaken U.S. imperialism.

Tactics and Techniques

The question of tactics is dealt with in a pragmatic course of military action. The tactical initiative in a revolutionary military strategy affords the guerrilla front the advantage to attack, advance, pursue, harass, defend, and retreat when necessary or desired. It is essential to grasp the principle that all guerrilla operations must preserve the element of surprise and superiority in either arms (firepower) and/or personnel (numbers). The element of surprise and superiority provides a tactical operation with the military advantage to engage and confront the enemy with minimum risk to the guerrillas, and maximum condition for operational success.

A. The Ambush

The principle foundation for the ambush-assault is total surprise, the target being out-numbered or out-gunned, and thereby, forced into a passive-defensive position or a surrender. Furthermore, the ambush-assault establishes the superiority of the guerrilla forces over the target, whether the action be a quick hit and run maneuver, expropriation, kidnapping or agitation-propaganda.

The ambush-assault is generally characterized as an action of quick decision. The manner of the attack is determined by the strength of the guerrilla unit, and the ability of the target to resist or ward off the attack. It is when the target is completely overpowered and its will to resist is dissipated in the first engagement, that the decisiveness is proven successful. The action that prevents any resistance and annihilates the target in the initial contact, is most characteristic of a successful ambush-assault.

The ambush-assault is used in varied ways and purposes. In some cases the ambush-assault will be employed in “seek out and destroy” (SOAD) operations. In these cases a particular target is searched, found, neutralized as soon as a plan of attack is forged in the field. In other cases the enemy will be lured to the site where the ambush will occur; another situation is planned on a target’s established route. In each of these cases the ambush-assault preserves the initiative in deciding where, when and how to make the

engagement, employing the elements of surprise and superiority.

The ambush-assault can be employed both in simple assaults and elaborate attacks depending on the size and strength of the target. To envelope the enemy — meaning to lure the target into a box attack from which the enemy is surrounded and contained from three sides, and the major assault forces pursue from the rear, and thereby, enveloping or encasing the enemy for total annihilation. The same goes for the bottleneck assault, where the enemy is lured into a box attack, allowing a narrow passage of seeming escape; but, is then destroyed in efforts to escape. Whether the bottleneck is eventually capped, depends upon the strength of the guerrilla units to cause disarray among enemy troops, and thereby wipe out the entire enemy force without incurring serious fatalities of their own.

Hit and run techniques, rather than pitched battles, are the best military tactics for small, ill-equipped, irregular guerrilla units. There should be an avoidance of stationary confrontations. The irregular guerrilla unit yields space for time, and time for position. Guerrillas do not defend buildings or material, only lives; the irregular guerrilla must preserve his/her life today to be able to fight another day.

The ambush as an assault tactic depends on great firepower, as well as swiftness in the attack and escape. Each ambush-assault must be planned decisively and executed according to plan, with an escape route and backup escape plan as part of the overall strategy. In such instances where the ambush-assault has as its objective expropriation (bank, postal office, armor truck) or kidnapping, the initial action must follow a minutely detailed plan, and must take immediate control of the area of engagement. All plans need to be rehearsed until each step moves smoothly and is automatic to all participants. In large operations, where several guerrilla units are employed, consideration should be given to using perimeter-assault units or diversionary tactics to hamper or hinder the enemy's defense of the target or along escape routes to prevent pursuit.

Because the ambush-assault employs surprise, superiority in numbers and/or firepower, and quick decisive hit and run tactics, it is the most used and relied upon by the irregular guerrilla units and most feared by the enemy.

B. Sniping

Snipers have many uses. Their primary purpose is to assassinate. The sniper assassin is one of the deadliest guerrillas in the front. Snipers in teams have been known to hold down hundreds of enemy troops for hours, and penetrate

the seemingly most secured perimeters.

Depending upon the type of weapons used, the sniper can be used in ambush-assault, in diversionary tactics, in sabotage, or as lone assassins. Snipers in teams, using long-range rifles, can be used in ambush-assaults or as diversionary fire. If a sniper uses incendiary or tracer shells, such projectiles can ignite fuel trucks and depots or any heat sensitive target in a sabotage attack.

The sniper assassin, whose capability is limited to the visibility of and distance from the target, is a valuable person in the area of operations for the guerrilla front. The marksmanship of the sniper should be complemented with skills in the use of assault rifles and sabotage, just as all other guerrillas need too be trained in sniping-assassination techniques.

C. Sabotage

The saboteur should be highly trained and technically skilled and have the strength of mind and nerve to perform in the most adverse situations. The proficiency of the saboteur must be in several areas. Saboteurs must be capable of determining the extent of damage to be made by the use of explosives, incendiaries, or such technical equipment as mortars, bazookas, rocket launchers or grenades. They must be skilled in several techniques and uses of various types of explosives, from chemically mixed incendiaries, to TNT, thermite and plastic explosives. They must give due consideration to the proper handling and use of such material.

Saboteurs will use water, sand, machinery, electricity, nails, nuts, bolts and any other instrument or tool when required to cripple or halt the production of machinery, to stifle the mobility or communication of the enemy forces or destroy major industries and government institutions. They must know how to blow up bridges, tankers, railroad lines and buildings.

Sabotage will be a widely used tactic to cause disruption and disarray to the State, to strike the current mode of production and to damage State control and implementation of government policies. It will be used in various ways as a direct assault tactic, in diversionary tactics, to disperse or exterminate enemy forces, and to demoralize and psychologically defeat the State's resistance to the revolution. Sabotage is a very useful and necessary military tactic that can be employed to either bring stress or relaxation to a hostile environmental condition depending on the extent of its use.

D. Armed Propaganda

The use of armed propaganda has several significant purposes, all based upon the tactical initiative. The principle purpose of armed propaganda is to make a general statement on a local, national or international level. It is essential to understand that all revolutionary violence has within it the seed of propaganda. But not all revolutionary violence necessarily makes a political statement, which enforces the nature of the action.

In many cases guerrilla units will attempt to publicize their action by sending communiqués to the media and progressive publications. At times, the State security forces (police, FBI, National Guard, CIA, etc.) will seize a communiqué and prevent media broadcast of the explanation of the revolutionary action, thus, the importance for guerrilla activity to readily coincide with the political climate of the mass movement. In other situations the State security forces and armed reactionary elements will attempt to turn the oppressed masses sentiments and support away from the guerrilla front. Their terrorist activity may appear similar to that of the guerrilla front, but their targets and their indiscriminate use of force will determine the significant difference from actions implemented by the guerrilla front. But because this situation will exist, it is incumbent for irregular guerrilla units to publicize the political basis for their actions.

In operations such as bank expropriations, or any expropriations where many civilians are present, it would be good to politically educate those present in the course of the operation. A leaflet can be left which explains the nature of armed struggle, the goals and objectives of the guerrilla front; or a brief speech concerning the operations purpose would be an excellent example of armed propaganda. The occupation of radio stations to air a taped message is another form of armed propaganda. Actions such as expropriations of food trucks for distribution in the community serves the same purpose. Kidnapping for ransom when the ransom serves the political mass movement and the needs of the community, is a means by which armed propaganda will heighten the political consciousness of the oppressed masses. Revolutionary justice that is selectively and timely committed serves to establish the strength of the guerrilla front to retaliate against attack. Also, revolutionary justice provides a sense of armed propaganda, informing the oppressed masses that the political mass movement will be defended.

Armed propaganda is revolutionary armed action with a dual significance. The action itself preserves the military initiative and flexibility of the guerrilla front, while such actions that are related to the political mass movement re-enforce the political determination and direction of the entire

class and national liberation struggle.

Revolutionary armed violence of international solidarity further broadens the perspective of armed propaganda, and serves to isolate and identify the enemy of oppressed classes and nationalities in various parts of the world; it bridges political relationships in anti-imperialist solidarity with national liberation struggles in the U.S. colonies and (so-called) protectorates.

Armed propaganda is a tactical initiative which establishes the political significance of a particular military operation. It forges the military operation's relationship with the political mass movement and broadens the criteria from which the oppressed masses can be militarily educated towards revolutionary armed struggle.

E. Kidnapping

The abduction of persons who represent the interests of the ruling class can be the most significant tactical initiative. It will bring on great repressive retaliation and media attention to the operation, and to the political determination of the guerrilla front. Essentially, kidnapping will serve three general purposes:

1. Monetary ransom;
2. Ransom for social services;
3. Ransom for the release of political prisoners of war.

It is necessary that the kidnap target be politically or financially equal to the demand, or that the number of persons kidnapped will place the State in a defensive position on negotiated terms. In many instances monopoly-capitalist targets will serve to obtain monetary ransom or social services, as in the case of the free food give-a-way in the SLA kidnapping of a Hearst family member. For the release of political prisoners of war, it will be necessary to kidnap a high official of the U.S. Justice Department, Treasury Department, National Security Agency, political officials of the federal government, or several of these in a series of actions, or representatives of foreign countries/nations who are economically, politically, and militarily aligned with U.S. imperialism.

The reason why the kidnap target must be a high political official is the U.S. has had a policy of no negotiation for kidnap and hostage situations. This policy can change if members of the ruling class are the targets, since they value their lives and affluence above and beyond the livelihood of the oppressed masses. Kidnapping is a very delicate tactical technique, militarily

striking at the greatest fears and insecurities of the State. Politically, it would be best for the guerrilla units to exercise discretion in kidnapping until the political mass movement is able to withstand the vicious repression of the State in search of the kidnappers and the kidnapped. The public readiness for such actions can be established by first selecting the targets that will serve the social service needs of the community, or the financial needs of the class and national liberation struggle. Gradualism in respects to heightening the contradiction between the oppressed and oppressor will prevent a backlash from the immense repression by the State. The antagonism stemming from the contradiction between the oppressed and the oppressor will enhance the political education and growing consciousness of the oppressed masses, as they are increasingly able to identify their oppressors. Kidnapping governmental officials and monopoly-capitalist persons ensures such identification and further defines the extent of the contradiction and disenfranchisement. In this tactical initiative, kidnapping provides a significant armed propaganda leverage for the guerrilla front. Herein lies the necessity for discretion in selection of a kidnap target in respects to the political climate of the political mass movement. The history of corruption, misappropriation of federal funds, monopoly-corporate investment and viciousness in policy making (hawkish warmongering) must all be linked to the targets and demands for ransom (restitution), thus, providing the political explanation for the abduction.

Because of the hard-line, no-negotiation policy of the U.S. government, there should be no hesitation in the guerrilla fronts action to soften this government policy. Complementary military operations can demonstrate the seriousness of the demand, as does the execution of the kidnap target when deadlines are not met. The discretion used concerning the release of a kidnap target when the demands are not met, should be based upon the target's position in government; their crimes against the oppressed masses and humanity; and whether or not their release will cause the guerrilla front any major political concern if they are not executed.

F. Expropriation

The securing of funds, arms, explosives, transportation, medical equipment, and various other supplies depends mainly upon the irregular guerrilla units' initiative in expropriation. To seize, capture or occupy through raids and assaults for the purpose of expropriation must be planned to the last detail. Because of the technical security alarm systems of banks, armored trucks, armories, and various financial institutions, it will be necessary for these planned operations to take into consideration many factors. The most

important of these factors is identification, communication, information and location of the State security forces. Thus, it is important for irregular guerrillas to prevent their being identified prior to the commencement of the operation, during the course of the operation, or after leaving the scene of the operation. The best cover for entering a place to be expropriated must be mapped out, to plan to take control of the area immediately; to get what it's after; and to retreat as smoothly and orderly as the operation began.

The time element is the next most important concern, for at all times the operation will be challenging the clock. When electronic security devices are used at an expropriation location, it is good to plan as if these devices have been activated, then cut the expected time before the police arrive in half. In this manner, the operation leaves room for unforeseen circumstances that could delay arrival at or departure from the location, and for problems that could effect operation time.

Third in importance, is the thoroughness of the plan of operation, covering the use of arms, personnel, transportation, safe-houses, and escape routes.

For guerrilla operations to out-maneuver the State security forces (police, National Guard, FBI, CIA, etc.), it is necessary for irregular guerrillas to always employ the element of surprise and superiority. In acts of expropriation — when, where, how and who are the only clues that should be left at the scene. The exception is when agitation-propaganda is disseminated. Thus, the irregular guerrilla units must seize every opportunity to do reconnaissance on the target. Learn its point of entry and exits, its security systems, both technical and personnel; the number of employees (male and female); location of sought after material and how to obtain it, and how to get it out of the building; learn whether the operation can be seen from windows, other floors or outside of the building by employees or civilians; find out from what location the police are likely to arrive, how soon, and in what force. Would gun fire in the general area cause great alarm, and if so to what extent, and would it cause the operation to be aborted. By covering all possibilities of failure of the operation and planning for success, the prospects for success in an operation of expropriation are enhanced.

Expropriation will broaden the guerrilla front's fighting capacity, allowing irregular guerrilla units to gain practical experience in armed operations because these operations, unlike an ambush-assault, can take more time, planning and cohesiveness. Precision in expropriation techniques should prevent a single shot from being fired, while planning can assure the security of each guerrilla in the course of the operation.

Expropriations will, for the most part, serve the needs of the guerrilla front. But when such operations secure a large sum of funds, these will serve the interest of the political mass movement. Expropriations will become primary means for the guerrilla front to fulfill its logistical supply requirements. Hence, the act of expropriation will need to become a practical tactical science.

G. Liberation of Prisoners

Liberating political prisoners of war will be a major priority within the guerrilla front. Opportunities for the liberation of prisoners do not arise often. Therefore, in an area where transfers, holding or placement of prisoners is routine, it is incumbent on the guerrilla front to plan for liberation. In areas near courts, city prisons, or highways/routes to penitentiaries, contingency plans for liberation can be rehearsed. These plans should include the use of arms, personnel, transportation, safehouses, escape routes, diversionary operations, and any possibility of infiltration-penetration of the State security forces. In other areas, where security is seemingly impregnable, joint operations should be planned in which political prisoners determine the weakness of their captivity and prospects for outside assistance. Joint operations must clearly establish the demarcation between areas of responsibility in planning the operation. Where the one ends, the other must begin, to fulfill the need of the joint operation and the success of the liberation. Most U.S. prisons are antiquated, molded over an old structure, and modern prisons utilize technological-electronic devices for security. In each case, blue prints of the construction, electrical system, plumbing-sewer systems, air shafts-ventilation systems, etc. are available, either inside the prison or at the company which constructed the prison. When the possibility of going under, over, or through the wall is nil, then the guerrilla front must employ the tactic of kidnapping and demanding the release of political prisoners of war.

In this country, over a million men and women are in prison, in a penal system that overtly enslaves, exploits and represses human will, as mandated in the 13th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. Where a formidable prison movement is established and thousands of politically conscious prisoners are rebelling against an inhumane, racist penal system, the liberation of political prisoners serves the political foundation of the prison movement and its relationship with the class and national struggle. It also forges the militancy of the prison movement towards support of revolutionary armed struggle and the guerrilla front. The liberation of political prisoners is essential in the course of building the guerrilla front's capacity to wage revolutionary armed

struggle and undermine the strength of the State security forces.

H. Psychological Warfare

Guerrilla warfare politically and militarily seeks to defeat its opposition, and destroy all prospects of future belligerency. The greatest plan of war is to defeat your opponent without direct engagement.

Militarily, the guerrilla front will attempt to inflict great damage on the State to stifle economic production, and prevent the State from procuring profits; to encourage the oppressed masses in their discontent to support the establishment of a socialist system of production, destroying the present State of capitalist-imperialism. It is not expected of the guerrilla front to defeat the U.S. military in direct confrontation. Rather, its goals are to demilitarize, demoralize, and destroy the fighting capacity of the U.S. military, its infantry, national guard, and police forces, psychologically and politically as the masses take to the streets in support of revolutionary armed struggle.

Psychological warfare in revolutionary armed struggle is employed on many levels. The most determinative concept is on the political level, from which the oppressed masses will be organized in support of the guerrilla front. On this level, the U.S. military will find it difficult to maintain order in the streets, or discipline in their ranks. Many soldiers (police) will put down their arms, turning them over to the guerrilla front, or turn them on their superiors in the service (as was the case in the last days of the Vietnam war). This level of mass participation in the harassing and demoralizing the fighting capacity of the State security force, and the U.S. military is the level of psychological warfare the guerrilla front must build towards.

But in the course of revolutionary armed struggle, repression and aggression from the State security forces will be relentless. To surmount this reactionary aggression, the guerrilla front must employ such psychological warfare tactics as subversion, deception, and dispersion of enemy forces.

To subvert the enemy is to cause internal upheaval within the ranks or operational capacity of the enemy. Through propaganda, the guerrilla front can cause one police precinct to charge another precinct with complicity with the armed struggle or political mass movement, by charging that a precinct has been infiltrated. Then all those in that precinct will suspect each other. Mistrust will destroy the fighting capacity of the precinct. In such cases where racism infects a particular police force, the guerrilla force must cause tension to climax until they are no longer able to work with one another or are fighting. Harassment of the State security forces in armed action such as

firebombing police cars and stations, blowing up police gasoline depots, stealing police files, burning police court evidence, distributing wanted posters of killer cops, blowing police union halls, etc. will all serve to harass and subvert the police.

Psychological warfare deception is to make false bomb threats, or have armed actions committed as a decoy to draw police forces to one area, while irregular guerrilla units move on a target in another area.

Dispersion is employed to spread out a concentrated enemy by committing armed actions in many areas at once, when choosing specific pockets of the enemy to annihilate. The enemy never knows which pocket will be attacked in force. Thus, they become psychologically fearful of dividing their forces at any time.

Psychological warfare tactically is to demoralize the enemy, to make the enemy believe they have lost the battle even before engagement. By striking at the fears and weaknesses of the enemy and causing the enemy to hit itself, the guerrilla front will wear out the enemy in a protracted war of attrition. It can also cause the enemy to mobilize forces on false rumors of operations planned by the guerrilla front.

By exposing official corruption, psychological warfare causes the enemy to suspect everyone and everything; to investigate it's every function, personnel, and capacity to confront the guerrilla front. It unnerves the enemy and causes them to fight amongst themselves. One of the best ploys to create a climate for destroying their image and demoralizing the police would be for irregular guerrilla units to expropriate funds from a bank or penetrate a security perimeter using police uniforms as disguises. The use of such disguises in successful operations will serve to embarrass the enemy forces, causing police officers unknown to each other to suspect one another of being a guerrilla. Of course, such disguises must be used carefully, so that the guerrillas will not mistake one another for the enemy.

Deception, subversion and dispersion are three essential tactics in psychological warfare operations, and are most relied upon in the guerrilla front. The above-mentioned tactical initiatives and techniques present the most used and relied upon areas of guerrilla warfare. Tactics in guerrilla warfare are short-term means that serve the fulfillment of a long-term strategy. Such tactical initiatives must develop continuity, upon which defenses are established for the political mass movement and strategic offenses are built in the revolutionary armed struggle. When the guerrilla front develops a strategy, and employs irregular guerrilla units tactically to implement the strategy, it is necessary that unit or squad leaders strictly

adhere to principles, and understand the significance of tactical success in carrying out the guerrilla front's politico-military strategy. The fighting capacity of any irregular guerrilla depends upon discipline, training skills, the adherence to military principles and direction in planned operations, the proper use of technical equipment and undaunting courage and fighting spirits.

Once irregular guerrillas have gained substantial combat experience, they must guard against becoming over-confident, arrogant, military adventuristic and romantic. Tactics maintain the delicate balance of discipline technique and adherence to military laws and principles, based upon the subjective condition of the target and the objective reality for combat. Guerrilla units must recognize that tactical initiatives serve to build towards a particular strategic objective, and the implementation of tactical techniques are the means to successfully engage the enemy. Furthermore, irregular guerrilla units' combative skills will strike fear in the heart of the enemy, forcing them to recognize the level of professionalism the guerrillas are employing. It is this fear and respect of the operational capacity of the guerrilla front that tactical techniques serve to secure as irregular guerrilla units develop the politico-military strategy of the revolutionary armed struggle.

I. Principles and Policies

For the guerrilla front to forge a practical politico-military strategy in the revolutionary armed struggle, it is incumbent that irregular guerrilla units adhere to various principles that dictate the mode of action within a given subjective combat situation. It is the strict adherence to principles of warfare that preserves the fighting capacity of irregular guerrilla units. The implementation of such principles evolves policies of actions, maintains the tactical initiative, and establishes a code of conduct in military affairs.

Principles are relative to a given situation, and applicable when the subjective cause and objective motive are interrelated for a particular effect. In a combat situation, cause, motive and effect are the most important determinative in the creation of strategies. The purpose of an action, whether it be in retaliation for an attack from the State security forces, or in support of the political mass movement and the guerrilla front, must be understood by all guerrillas; the motive of the action will be to destroy, harass, expropriate, subvert, or disperse the enemy; while the effect is consequential to the cause and motive, establishing the basis for either heightened militancy, neutralization of antagonism or easing of belligerency. Once these three aspects of cause, motive, and effect have been adequately embraced as

determining factors and principles to devise politico-military strategies and tactical initiatives, the irregular guerrilla can then proceed to gain an understanding of those principles which evolve policies of action in the course of establishing the revolutionary armed struggle.

Irregular guerrilla units must be self-reliant, be self-possessed, and have self-control and self-confidence. Each of these preserves the internal discipline and determination for the individual guerrilla to have the capacity to save themselves and others in an adverse situation. Thus, the entire guerrilla front becomes capable of surmounting obstacles, relying on the collective strengths of the individuals through the organized functions of the guerrilla front. Units of the guerrilla front must never underestimate or overestimate themselves or the enemy. To underestimate one's own capability would be to limit one's capacity to engage the enemy in combat, to utilize the available resources, personnel, intelligence, and to advantageously capture the initiative and bring fear, chaos, death and destruction to the enemy. Not seeking the enemy's weaknesses and not building upon or using such weaknesses for one's own strength, prevents confrontation or taking the military initiative, because of overestimating the enemy's strength. To overestimate one's strength, would be subjective, in not taking into account the enemy's strength in comparison to one's strength. This would cause one not to take into account the prospects for military engagement that could destroy the guerrilla front, because an analysis and evaluation has not been made of the strength and weaknesses of both guerrilla front units and the State security forces. Subjecting one's determination either to engage or not to engage the enemy in combat on feelings, will, fear or hatred is empirical, romantically adventuristic, and haphazard. All tactical initiatives must be based upon exact and definite understanding of the objective realities of one's own strength in comparison to the enemy's weaknesses; one's weaknesses to the strengths of the enemy. To under or overestimate one's fighting capacity or the enemy's leads to committing errors in planning engagements that can ultimately be disastrous. It must be clearly understood that no guerrilla engages in combat without the assurance of victory based upon definite evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses between contending forces.

Irregular guerrilla units must employ principles of deception that will keep the enemy off balance and off guard. To feign weakness when one is strong, and strength when weak, can cause the enemy to attack over confidently, leading to serious errors and their destruction; or cause the enemy to forestall an attack that would have virtually exterminated all prospects of recovery. In another area of deception, guerrillas can project concentration of forces or can plan operation in one area, while actually operating and concentrating forces in another — can appear in the East but strike in the West — thus

causing the enemy to hesitate, to doubt, and position for guerrilla front operations.

Units of the guerrilla front, must at all times employ the element of surprise and superiority in all engagements, confrontations, and operations. The element of surprise as maintained by choice of the guerrillas, determining when, where, and how to engage the enemy. The when, where, and how refer to the time, place, and what arms are to be used, and by how many guerrillas in an engagement. For guerrillas to choose the time of all engagements essentially means to be able to place the enemy in a subservient and unsuspecting position. The element of surprise provides the guerrillas being decisive in such operations. The superiority of guerrillas depends on the element of surprise, firepower, the ability to control the entire operation, and swift retreat. Whenever the guerrillas are weak in numbers, they must be strong in firepower, and when they are weak in firepower — strong in numbers. This policy of action, and of decisiveness in operations preserves the guerrilla advantage in determining and end-effect of the ambush-assault.

Irregular guerrilla units must employ constant initiative, constant flexibility and constant mobility. These three principles and policies of action develop continuity in practice, tactical variety in technique, and stability in motivation. Having and maintaining the initiative forges continuity upon which the irregular guerrilla units act and or react to given combat situations or the needs of the political mass movement and the guerrilla front. This initiative forecloses the enemy's attempts to lure guerrillas into confrontations or to force guerrillas to cease operations because of their repressive and political manipulations. Once continuity has been established in respects to the guerrillas initiative, guerrillas must be flexible in planning operations. They must take space to gain time and position, or use time to gain space and position. They must employ varied tactics to keep the enemy off guard, appearing in the East and striking in the West, initiating direct ambush-assaults here and bombing raids there; pursuing psychological warfare, then starting sniping campaigns before entering a strategic retreat and a period of non-engagement. Flexibility determines the character of the initiative, while mobility preserves the initiative. Mobility assures to appear everywhere at once and to disappear without trace; to concentrate and disperse forces according to plans of retreat; to prevent detection or encirclement by the enemy; and, to continue to pursue a particular strategic objective. The mobility of irregular guerrilla units prohibits the establishment of fixed bases that can be isolated for capture or attack. It prevents the stagnation of guerrillas when they are not immediately implementing a strategic or tactical objective. Constant initiative, constant flexibility, and constant mobility are three of the most definite principles governing the policies of action; to further operate to substantiate the defensive character of

revolutionary armed struggle, and building towards the strategic offense.

Irregular guerrilla units of the guerrilla front, carry out operations according to the subjective and objective conditions of the target, and the guerrilla's ability to meet the demands of the operation. The subjective and objective conditions are determined by an accurate assessment of one's own strength and weaknesses, and the strength and weaknesses of the enemy. This evaluation will provide the necessary information and intelligence for guerrillas to plan operations, to execute the operation according to plan, and to escape after the fulfillment of the planned operation. No operation is complete until all guerrillas have evaded apprehension and are safely at a point of security, as stipulated in the plan of escape.

The concepts of planning, execution, and escape are significant in all operations. To plan an operation or any activity of the guerrilla fronts politico-military strategy is to consciously detail and conceive the intent, purpose, goals, consequences, and prospects of success. All subjective and objective conditions pertaining to the activity must be taken into account. What are the guerrilla capabilities and inabilities? What are the target enemy's strengths and weaknesses, how to get to and from the target area, and what kind of transportation is to be used; what arms will be used, how are they to be used at what interval? Who will be responsible for what particular area of work in the course of the operation, executing the plan according to a timetable based upon the responsibility of each participant, and the activity necessary to accomplish the task? Escaping according to plan, planning an alternative escape route, swiftly and inconspicuously, without leaving a trace or trail that can be picked up by pursuing State security forces.

To plan, execute (according to plan) and escape (with alternative escape routes) is the most important policy of action in which operations should be commenced. The guerrilla unit leader, being responsible for the planning of all operations, must be adamant in upholding this policy of action prior to the commencement of any tactical maneuvers making up the politico-military strategy of the guerrilla front.

Irregular guerrilla units of the guerrilla front, must be thoroughly familiar with the terrain they are operating or residing in. With such knowledge they will be able to ensure escape from pursuing State security forces. Although guerrillas do not establish fixed bases or positions, nor defend such areas in pitched battles, knowledge of terrain allows guerrillas to maintain mobility. Such mobility prevents encirclement by the State security forces, and allows the guerrillas to maintain their initiative.

To have knowledge of the terrain in urban centers consists of knowing the back alleys and streets, backyards, roof tops, sewer systems, pipelines, constructions sites, parks, playgrounds, buildings with street level windows or doorways that lead through the building to the back area; transportation in the area and in what direction throughout the urban center does it move; the location of police precincts, the civic center, and various social service bureaucracies. All of this provides indicators by which to establish perimeters and escape routes. In rural areas, knowledge of major highways, and farming routes, forests and dams, railroad routes and truck stops and loading zones, highway tolls, electrical power installations, the local towns and villages, city and country limits. For both urban and rural guerrillas, the study of maps and the use of compasses are essential for reconnaissance and planning operations.

Having knowledge of a given terrain provides guerrillas with the means to choose favorable sites to engage the enemy. It will determine the extent of guerrilla operations ability to penetrate enemy defenses or to sustain the tactical initiative. Knowledge of terrain is also an important asset to guerrillas in enabling them to stifle the pursuit of the enemy forces, to evade capture, and virtually control the field of military operations.

Irregular guerrilla units must know how and when to implement a strategic retreat. The purpose of a strategic retreat is to preserve the fighting capacity and ability of the guerrillas to initiate tactical maneuvers. It is based on ceasing direct confrontations with the enemy. It is an active retreat, to take assessment of the guerrilla front politico-military strategy, to determine whether it continues to correspond with the political mass movement's aspirations, and whether it has had positive results in enhancing political and militant consciousness of the oppressed masses; to determine how its tactical initiatives have damaged the prestige, morale, affluence, and socio-psychological, economic and political welfare of the bourgeoisie; to evaluate the guerrilla front's infra-structure to secure and procure available resources, intelligence, and logistics for future operations; to secure clandestine functions, to train and place new recruits; and broaden the operational capacity of the guerrilla front.

Although the strategic retreat is a ceasing of direct military confrontations with the enemy forces, it is not a total ceasing of operations necessary to preserve the capacity of the guerrilla front to forge revolutionary armed struggle. At times of strategic retreat, the guerrilla front may have exhausted logistics and supplies, or might be actively defending itself from the offensive of the State security forces encirclement and suppression campaigns. Whatever the reason, the strategic retreat provides the means by which the guerrilla front can recover from an adverse or defensive posture, or it can

strengthen the front's ability to engage the enemy at will, and to further revolutionary armed struggle across the entire country.

Irregular guerrilla units throughout the protracted period of armed struggle must be defensive in all tactical initiatives, planning operations, employing varied tactical techniques, and they must maintain principles and policies of action to limit the risk factor and maximize tactical victories.

To know when to advance and pursue the enemy in a counter-offensive; to know when to harass and to use psychological warfare; to know when, how and where to defend either the political mass movement, or the politico-military strategy of the guerrilla front; and to know when to develop a strategic retreat are the four major military questions, answers to which will provide understanding of how guerrilla warfare is to be implemented, fought, and sustained — amidst obstacles, set backs, betrayals, and the vicious repression of the State.

Lessons from Tactical Errors

In the course of building revolutionary armed struggle in North America, many tactical errors have been made by various clandestine organizations. Understanding these tactical errors, which in some cases caused the abortion of strategic objectives or the liquidation of underground organizations, will provide the basis from which new organizational (underground) structures can learn correct practices.

The following is a list of tactical errors irregular guerrilla units must guard against:

1. No political aboveground organization should develop armed selfdefense units within its organizational structure. Instead, separate community self-defense units should be set up which will serve to protect the interest of the political organization, and its relationship with the community. The military underground apparatus must develop its own organizational structure and capacity to forge revolutionary armed struggle.
2. Political activists and military combatants must never live together. Each must maintain their own livelihood. This will prevent those who are active in the underground from being identified, captured or informed against by possible infiltrators or provocateurs in the aboveground political organizations, or by surveillance of political activists. Those functioning in the underground must maintain every means by which their identity will be safe, thus, living inconspicuously amongst the masses. Those unknown to the police can obtain employment and project a normal civilian life-style. Safe houses are the exception to this rule; here military combatants may stay a short period of time with non-combatants.
3. There should never be open recruitment to the clandestine military organization. All new recruits must be known individuals who have had experience in the political organizations of the class and national liberation struggle. This stifles the possibility of infiltration underground.
4. New recruits who have been through orientation and training should be placed in secondary guerrilla units and operate as back-up teams and squads until they have been tested in actual combat and have become experienced in guerrilla warfare. Primary guerrilla units (professionals),

should live apart from secondary guerrilla units (non-professionals). They should only come together at times of operations in the field, the two units functioning in their own capacities, according to the plan of operation. Secondary units can graduate to primary levels after performing in several operations as back-up units, or as needed by the guerrilla front.

5. Strict centralization of irregular guerrilla units can hinder the initiative in developing revolutionary armed struggle, while over-decentralization prevents the creation of the national politico-military strategy, and the advent of a United Guerrilla Front or Peoples Liberation Army. The guerrilla front must be capable of centralizing non-mobile guerrilla units (unknown revolutionaries) who are functioning in the infrastructure on local and regional levels, while the decentralization of mobile guerrilla units (known revolutionaries). This stabilizes the growth and development of revolutionary armed struggle, broadening the means of building a national politico-military strategy and the United Guerrilla Front.
6. To prevent military romanticism and adventurism, all guerrilla organization must have a concrete ideology that determines the political foundation from which military operations appeal to the oppressed masses. Thus the theory of armed struggle can be understood politically as it is manifested in practice.
7. Irregular guerrilla units must guard against over-use of expropriations to finance operations. Many captured revolutionaries from the underground have been caught during expropriations. It seemed every other operation had to be for expropriation to finance another tactical initiative. Professional guerrillas must be capable of expropriating large sums of money and secure large sums of funds from ransom of kidnap targets to finance tactical campaigns, not single tactical operation. This limits the use of expropriations and enhance the criteria for the initiation of tactical campaigns.
8. The kidnapped person must never be recruited into the underground apparatus. If such abductions are based upon the target's willingly setting themselves up for kidnap and ransom because they are really political activists, they should be released after the demands of ransom have been met and allowed to propagate the goals and objectives of the revolutionary struggle since media attention will provide the means for extensive agitation-propaganda. Or they can be allowed to enter the underground after a period of time when the media attention has concerned itself with another event. The major point is that unknown guerrillas maintain the clandestine nature of the underground, and avoid personality cults and sensationalism that can undermine the political thrust of the class and national liberation struggle. If kidnap targets are

not to be killed, they are to be released. If they then choose to serve the revolution, this must be from either the aboveground political arena, or as an intelligence personnel providing information to the guerrilla front concerning the ruling class.

9. Irregular guerrillas must never display weapons or revolutionary intentions when not engaged in tactical operations. They must dress, act, and become like one of the people in the given community. All mannerism must reflect the attitude of the community where they reside; their living quarters should be free of posters or literature and other visible material that could identify their political affiliations. They must appear to be just another working person with a normal existence camouflaging their identity.
10. Irregular guerrilla units must never engage in stationary pitched battles, not in defense of buildings, materials or other property. Pitched battles may occur in the course of tactical operations when the State forces stumble across, discover, or have been alerted to guerrillas in operations. The battle will therefore be in defense of comrades who can escape, if others engage the enemy and hinder pursuit. Snipers must secure a means of escape from roof tops or tall buildings. If irregular guerrillas are in a building or safe house, and are encircled, whereby escape is improbable they must decide whether pitch battle could provide a means of escape, whether to surrender, or to engage the enemy to the death. But to defend buildings, property or material over lives is tactically incorrect. Buildings, property or material can be regained, but the lives of guerrillas are most valuable, and their deaths are a serious loss in the revolutionary armed struggle.
11. Irregular guerrilla units must guard against premature assassination of reactionary community leaders. Influential individuals in the community who are subverting and undermining the revolution must be thoroughly exposed and discredited to the oppressed masses. This exposure provides the means for the oppressed masses to become politically conscious of the harm and detriment to the class and national liberation struggle these individuals represent. Thus, the oppressed masses will in time deem their removal from a position of public influence necessary. If the community is unable to remove them from office or a position of power, and they continue in their reactionary programs, it is then incumbent for the guerrilla front to exterminate these individuals. It is then the will of the oppressed masses.
12. The guerrilla front must be cautious of the over-use of media propaganda or becoming sensationalist news events. This can lead towards military romanticism and adventurism. Tactical initiatives that readily appeal to the political climate and the aspirations of the mass and popular movement need agitation-propaganda to explain the military operations.

But those tactical initiatives that serve the interest of the guerrilla front need not be publicized, unless they have ill-effects on the political mass movement.

13. Irregular guerrillas must be selective in their targets. They must use the will of the masses to identify their enemies and the institutions that represent their continued oppression-repression. These local and regional targets must be reconnoitered and their weaknesses and strengths determined. This will decide whether there will be a day or night operation, and how many civilians will be around the target area. Avoidance of civilian casualties should be foremost in all operations of sabotage, sniping, expropriations and ambush-assaults. The selection of targets and terrain should provide the greatest appeal to the political aspirations of the class and national liberation struggle.
14. Irregular guerrillas who are saboteurs must be most careful with the use of explosives. Too many revolutionaries have blown up themselves and others out of carelessness. Saboteurs must be well trained in the use of explosives, bombing techniques, diligent, meticulous, and extremely cautious in their work.
15. When captured, revolutionaries must never divulge information that would lead to the capture or death of other members of the underground. Nor should they provide information concerning the function of the guerrilla front, location of materials, safe houses or anything pertaining to the infrastructure. Even under torture and the threat of death, to give up information that could lead to the capture or death of other revolutionaries is an intolerable crime against the revolution.

These are some of the major lessons to learn from errors by participants in the underground in the past. Other areas of concern are as follows:

1. There should be complete trust, confidence, and security within each unit, each unit explicitly following orders of the unit leader, and the directives of the guerrilla front.
2. The best shot in the unit should always handle the machinegun or any other fully automatic weapon; and those skilled in other technical equipment must use that skill when necessary.
3. Recruiting must be of those only known by members of the unit or guerrilla front, and be vigorous and cautious always.
4. Guerrillas must know only what is necessary to know in any area of responsibility and in relationship to their work. They must know all there is to know about their area of responsibility, becoming proficient and skilled.
5. All information about operations should be relegated to memory; no diaries, reports, books or other written information should be kept. What cannot be relegated to memory need not be kept.

6. Always destroy incriminating material that is not being used by the guerrilla front, especially material from expropriations.
7. There should never be any boastfulness or gossiping about military activities or internal secrets.